In Book v of Plato's Laws, he defends that a virtuous life is better than a vicious one, based on the idea that the former involves more pleasure than the latter (733a-734e). The use of this kind of argumentation seems to contradict other passages of the Laws, in which it will be objected that pleasure can work as a criterion of election. This essay aims to show that this recourse does not presuppose any kind of hedonism. In order to prove (...) this, I hold that in the Laws (i) education tries to integrate our natural tendencies in the good life; (ii) this integration is possible because some pleasures can be pursued for their own sake because they are harmless. Based on these principles, I argue that (iii) the argument of Book v appeals to the possibility of choosing pleasure if they are not involved in other criteria of election. (shrink)

Plato’s characterization of philia in Lysis, on one hand, as one-sided belonging to the ultimate object of our desire and, on the other, as interpersonal reciprocal belonging appears problematic. Yonesawa has recently claimed that one can make sense of both uses of “belonging” if we assume that one is the other’s friend when each one coincides in being the ultimate object of the other’s desire. This paper proposes instead that Lysis’ ‘reciprocity’ of friendship results from friends’ right wanting, which presupposes (...) their souls are well-disposed to a true object of desire. To prove this, I will argue that (i) the action and the argument of the dialogue exhibit this kind of reciprocity, (ii) there is a ‘unique’ ultimate object of desire (‘teleological monism’), that consists of a ‘knowledge about the good life’ and (iii) only the common longing for such knowledge can make possible friends’ reciprocal belonging. (shrink)

La interpretación evolutiva y unitaria que hace Gadamer de los escritos de Platón supone en sus fundamentos una comprensión bastante particular sobre la ‘estructura pregunta-respuesta' característica de los diálogos platónicos. Este trabajo intenta mostrar la radicalidad del planteamiento gadamereano de la dialéctica platónica, así como la conexión esencial entre esta estructura y el fenómeno central de la hermenéutica, a saber, el fenómeno de la comprensión. De esta manera, ambos elementos se presentarán bajo una mutua dependencia, en cuanto que la filosofía (...) hermenéutica se reconoce reflexivamente a sí misma en la ejecución del diálogo platónico. Gadamer's evolutionary and unitary interpretation of Plato's writings assumes a rather particular understanding of the ‘question-and-answer form' . This work intends to show the radicalism of Gadamer's views about the Platonic dialectic, as well as the essential connection between that structure and the central phenomenon of hermeneutics, i.e. the phenomenon of comprehending . In this way, both elements are shown to depend on each other, as Hermeneutic philosophy recognizes itself through the realization of the Platonic dialogue. (shrink)

The just person controls his appetites by virtue of an alliance between his rational and spirited parts: while the first determines the object of the action, the second gives stability and strength to the prescription of reason. This essay aims to show that the spirited part can give strength to reason’s orders, only if it also receives value (i.e. the restoration of the individual’s damaged image). From this, I argue that the spirited part (i) always takes the side of reason (...) in the conflict with appetites (as enemies of the individual’s freedom) and, nevertheless, (ii) it can oppose [to] reason when the appetitive part is not at stake (and the claim of restoration, i.e. revenge, is repressed by reason). (shrink)

El trabajo presenta un modelo de psicología moral a partir del análisis del libro primero de las Leyes de Platón y, en particular, de la imagen de la marioneta. Entre los intérpretes contemporáneos se debate sobre si esta imagen compromete una comprensión de la templanza como “victoria” sobre los placeres o si más bien respalda una comprensión de esta virtud como “acuerdo” entre estos y la razón. Para responder a esta cuestión, se recurrirá a la psicología bipartita del Filebo. Esto (...) permitirá reconocer, en la educación de la virtud, el conflicto entre afectos y, en el resultado de este proceso educativo, el acuerdo entre razón y afectividad. (shrink)

Die Platonforschung hat sich immer wieder mit den interpretatorischen Schwierigkeiten des Philebos befasst. Wahrscheinlich besteht die ernsthafteste Schwierigkeit dieses Dialogs darin, die Vielfalt der Themen, die hier behandelt werden, miteinander zu verbinden. Im Philebos wird die Frage nach dem guten Leben als Hauptthema vorgestellt, aber im Laufe des Dialogs werden sowohl dialektische Überlegungen über das Problem des Einen und Vielen als auch eine Klassifikation der ontologischen Gattungen des Kosmos eingeführt. Angesichts dieser Situation haben sich viele Interpreten ausschließlich auf die theoretischen (...) Fragen konzentriert, ohne den Zusammenhang zwischen diesen Fragen und der ethischen Fragestellung zu berücksichtigen. Dieser Beitrag versucht zu erklären, wie die Frage nach dem guten Leben mithilfe der Begriffsanalyse behandelt werden soll, sodass die dialektische Reflexion über die Bedingungen der Sprache durch die Sachorientierung der ethischen Fragestellung erforderlich wird. Der Philebos kann demnach nur als eine kompositorische Einheit betrachtet werden, sofern man zunächst die hier vorliegende Verbindung von Ethik und Dialektik versteht. (shrink)